Certifiably Robust Interpretation in Deep Learning by Levine, Alexander et al.
Certifiably Robust Interpretation in Deep Learning
Alexander Levine1, Sahil Singla2, and Soheil Feizi3
1,2,3University of Maryland, College Park
3Corresponding Author (sfeizi@cs.umd.edu)
Abstract
Although gradient-based saliency maps are popular methods for deep learning interpretation, they
can be extremely vulnerable to adversarial attacks. This is worrisome especially due to the lack of
practical defenses for protecting deep learning interpretations against attacks. In this paper, we address
this problem and provide two defense methods for deep learning interpretation. First, we show that a
sparsified version of the popular SmoothGrad method, which computes the average saliency maps over
random perturbations of the input, is certifiably robust against adversarial perturbations. We obtain this
result by extending recent bounds for certifiably robust smooth classifiers to the interpretation setting.
Experiments on ImageNet samples validate our theory. Second, we introduce an adversarial training
approach to further robustify deep learning interpretation by adding a regularization term to penalize
the inconsistency of saliency maps between normal and crafted adversarial samples. Empirically, we
observe that this approach not only improves the robustness of deep learning interpretation to adversarial
attacks, but it also improves the quality of the gradient-based saliency maps.
1 Introduction
The growing use of deep learning in many sensitive areas like autonomous driving, medicine, finance and
even the legal system ([1, 2, 3, 4]) raises concerns about human trust in machine learning systems. Therefore,
having interpretations for why certain predictions are made is critical for establishing trust between users
and the machine learning system.
In the last couple of years, several approaches have been proposed for interpreting neural network outputs
([5, 6, 7, 8, 9]). Specifically, [5] computes the elementwise absolute value of the gradient of the largest class
score with respect to the input. To define some notation, let g(x) be this most basic form of the gradient-
based saliency map, for an input image x ∈ Rn. For simplicity, we also assume that elements of g(x) have
been linearly normalized to be between 0 and 1. g(x) represents, to a first order linear approximation, the
importance of each pixel in determining the class label (see Figure 1-a). Numerous variations of this method
have been introduced in the last couple of years which we review in the appendix.
A popular saliency map method which extends the basic gradient method is SmoothGrad [10], which
takes the average gradient over random perturbations of the input. Formally, we define the smoothing
function as:
g¯(x) ∶= E [g(x + )] , (1.1)
where  has a normal distribution (i.e.  ∼ N (0, σ2I)). We will discuss other smoothing functions in Section
3.1 while the empirical smoothing function which computes the average over finitely many perturbations of
the input will be discussed in Section 3.3. We refer to the basic method described in the above equation as
the scaled SmoothGrad 1.
aving a robust interpretation method is important since interpretation results are often used in down-
stream actions such as medical recommendations, object localization, program debugging and safety, etc.
1The original definition of SmoothGrad does not normalize and take the absolute values of gradient elements before averaging.
We start with the definition of equation 1.1 since it is easier to explain our results for, compared to a more general case. We
discuss a more general case in Section 3.
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Figure 1: (a) An illustration of the sensitivity of gradient-based saliency maps to an adversarial perturbation
of an image from CIFAR-10. Sparsified SmoothGrad, however, demonstrates a significantly larger robustness
compared to that of the gradient method. (b) A comparison of robustness certificate values Rcert/K of
Sparsified SmoothGrad vs. scaled SmoothGrad, on ImageNet images.
However, [11] has shown that several gradient-based interpretation methods are sensitive to adversarial ex-
amples, obtained by adding a small perturbation to the input image. These adversarial examples maintain
the original class label while greatly distorting the saliency map (Figure 1-a).
Although adversarial attacks and defenses on image classification have been studied extensively in recent
years (e.g. [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]), to the best of our knowledge, there is no practical defense
for deep learning interpretation against adversarial examples [22]. This is partially due to the difficulty of
protecting high-dimensional saliency maps compared to defending a class label, as well as to the lack of a
ground truth for interpretation.
Since a ground truth for interpretation is not available, we use a similarity metric between the original
and perturbed saliency maps as an estimate of the interpretation robustness. We define R(x, x˜,K) as the
number of overlapping elements between top K largest elements of saliency maps of x and its perturbed
version x˜. For an input x, this measure depends on its specific perturbation x˜. We define R∗(x,K) as the
robustness measure with respect to the worst perturbation of x. That is,
R∗(x,K) ∶= min
x˜
R(x, x˜,K) (1.2)∥x˜ − x∥2 ≤ ρ.
For deep learning models, this optimization is non-convex in general. Thus, characterizing the true robustness
of interpretation methods will be a daunting task.
In our first main result of this paper, we show that a lower bound on the true robustness value of
an interpretation method (i.e. a robustness certificate) can be computed efficiently. In other words, for a
given input x, we compute a robustness certificate Rcert such that Rcert(x,K) ≤ R∗(x,K). To establish the
robustness certificate for saliency map methods, we first prove the following result for a general function h(.)
whose range is between 0 and 1:
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Figure 2: An illustration of the proposed adversarial training to robustify deep learning interpretation on
MNIST. We observe that the proposed adversarial training not only enhances the robustness but it also
improves the quality of the gradient-based saliency maps.
Theorem 1. Let h(x) be the output of an interpretation method whose range is between 0 and 1 and let h¯
be its smoothed version defined as in Equation equation 1.1. Let h¯i(x) and h¯[i](x) be the i-th element and
the i-th largest elements of h¯(x), respectively. Let Φ be the cdf of the normal distribution. If
Φ(Φ−1 (h¯[i](x)) − 2ρ
σ
) ≥ h¯[2K−i](x), (1.3)
then for the smoothed interpretation method, we have Rcert(x,K) ≥ i.
Intuitively, this means that, if there is a sufficiently large gap between the i-th largest element of the
smoothed saliency map and its (2K − i)-th largest element, then we can certify that at least i elements
in the top K largest elements of the original smoothed saliency map will also be in the top K elements
of adversarially perturbed saliency map. We present a more general version of this result with empirical
expectations for smoothing as well as another rank-based robustness certificate in Section 3. The proof of
this bound relies on an extension of the results of [23] which addresses certified robustness in the classification
case. Proofs for all theorems are given in the Appendix.
Evaluating the robustness certificate for the scaled SmoothGrad method on ImageNet samples produced
vacuous bounds (Figure 1-b). This motivated us to develop variations of SmoothGrad with larger robustness
certificates. One such variation is Sparsified SmoothGrad which is defined by smoothing a sparsification
function that maps the largest elements of g(x) to one and the rest to zero. Sparsified SmoothGrad obtains
a considerably large value of the robustness certificate (Figure 1-b) while producing high-quality saliency
maps. We study other variations of Sparsified SmoothGrad in Section 3.
Our second main result in this paper is to develop an adversarial training approach to further robustify
deep learning interpretation methods. Adversarial training is a common technique used to improve the
robustness of classification models, by generating adversarial examples to the classification model during
training, and then re-training the model to correctly classify these examples [21].
To the best of our knowledge, adversarial training has not yet been adapted to the interpretation domain.
In this paper, we develop an adversarial training approach for the interpretation problem in two steps: First,
we develop an adversarial attack on the interpretation as the L2 extension of the L∞ attack introduced in
[11]. We use the developed attack to craft adversarial examples to saliency maps during training. Second,
we re-train the network by adding a regularization term to the training loss that penalizes the inconsistency
of saliency maps between normal and crafted adversarial samples.
Empirically, we observe that our proposed adversarial training for interpretation significantly improves
the robustness of saliency maps to adversarial attacks. Interestingly, we also observe that our proposed
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adversarial training improves the quality of the gradient-based saliency maps as well (Figure 2). We note that
this observation is related to the observation made in [24] showing that adversarial training for classification
improves the quality of the gradient-based saliency maps.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
We introduce the following notations to indicate Gaussian smoothing: for a function h, we define population
and empirical smoothed functions, respectively, as:
h¯(x) =E∼N (0,σ2I)[h(x + )]
h˜(x) =1
q
q∑
i=1h(x + i) i ∼ N (0, σ2I) (2.1)
In other words, h¯(x) represents the expected value of h(x) when smoothed under normal perturbations of
 with some standard deviation σ while h˜(x) represents an empirical estimate of h¯(x) using q samples. We
call σ2 the smoothing variance and q the number of smoothing perturbations.
We use vi to denote the i
th element of the vector v. Similarly hi(x) denotes the ith element of the output
h(x). We also define, for any h(x), rank(h(x), i) as the ordinal rank of hi(x) in h(x) (in the descending
order): rank(h(x), i) = j denotes that hi(x) is the jth largest element in h(x). We use x[i] to denote the
ith largest element in x. If i is not an integer, the ceiling of i is used. We use n to denote the dimension of
the input.
3 Smoothing for Certifiable Robustness
3.1 Sparsified SmoothGrad
In this section, we will derive general bounds which allow us to certify the robustness for a large class of
smoothed saliency map methods. These bounds are applicable to any saliency map method whose range is[0,1]n. Note that while SmoothGrad [10] is similar to such methods, it requires some modifications for our
bounds to be directly applicable. [10] in particular defines two methods, which we will call SmoothGrad
and Quadratic SmoothGrad. SmoothGrad takes the mean over samples of the signed gradient values, with
absolute value typically taken after smoothing for visualization. Quadratic SmoothGrad takes the mean of
the elementwise squares of gradient values. Both methods therefore require modification for our bounds to
be applied: we define scaled SmoothGrad g˜(x), such that g(x) is the elementwise absolute value of the
gradient, linearly scaled so that the largest element is one. We can silimarly define a scaled Quadratic
SmoothGrad.
We first realized that scaled SmoothGrad and Quadratic SmoothGrad give vacuous robustness certificate
bounds, as we demonstrated in Figure 1. Instead, we developed a new method, Sparsified SmoothGrad, which
has (1) non-vacuous robustness certificates at ImageNet scale (Figure 4a), (2) similar high-quality visual
output to SmoothGrad, and (3) theoretical guarantees that aid in setting its hyper-parameters (Section 3.5).
The Sparsified SmoothGrad is defined as g˜[τ], where g[τ] is defined as follows:
g
[τ]
i (x) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩0, if gi(x) < g[τn](x)1, if gi(x) ≥ g[τn](x) (3.1)
In other words, τ controls the degree of sparsification: a fraction τ of elements (the largest τn elements
of g(x)) are assigned to 1, and the rest are set to 0.
3.2 Robustness Certificate for the Population Case
In order to derive a robustness certificate for saliency maps, we present an extension of the classification
robustness result of [23] to real-valued functions, rather than discrete classification functions. In our case,
we will apply this to the saliency map vector g. First, we define a floor function to simplify notation.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Sparsified SmoothGrad (with the sparsification parameter τ = 0.1) with the Smooth-
Grad methods defined by [10]. All methods lead to high-quality saliency maps while our proposed Sparsified
SmoothGrad is certifiably robust to adversarial examples as well. Additional examples have been presented
in the appendix.
Definition 3.1. (Floor function) The Floor function is a function L ∶ [0,1]→ [0,1], such that
L(z) = Φ(Φ−1 (z) − 2ρ
σ
)
where ρ denotes the L2 norm of the adversarial distortion and σ
2 denotes the smoothing variance. Φ is the
cdf function for the standard normal distribution and Φ−1 is its inverse.
Below is our main result used in characterizing robustness certificates for interpretation methods:
Theorem 1. Let h ∶ Rn → [0,1]n be a real-valued function. Let L(.) be the floor function defined as in
equation 3.1 with parameters σ2 and ρ. Using σ2 ∈ R as the smoothing variance for h, ∀ i, j ∈ [n], x, x˜ ∈ Rn
where ∥x − x˜∥ ≤ ρ:
L (h¯i(x)) ≥ h¯j(x)⇒ h¯i(x˜) ≥ h¯j(x˜).
Note that this theorem is valid for any general function. However, we will use it for our case where h¯(x) is
a smoothed saliency map. Theorem 1 states that, for a given saliency map vector h¯(x), if L(h¯i(x)) ≥ h¯j(x),
then if x is perturbed inside an L2 norm ball of radius at most ρ, h¯i(x˜) ≥ h¯j(x˜).
This result extends Theorem 1 in [23] in two ways: first, it provides a guarantee about the difference
in the values of two quantities, which in general might not be related, while the original result compared
probabilities of two mutually exclusive events. Second, we are considering a real-valued function h, rather
than a classification output which can only take discrete values. This bound can be compared directly to
[25]’s result which similarly concerns unrelated elements in a vector. Just as in the classification case (as
noted by [23]), Theorem 1 gives a significantly tighter bound than that of [25] (see details in the appendix).
3.3 Robustness Certificate for the Empirical Case
In this section, we extend our robustness certificate result of Theorem 1 to the case where we use empirical
estimates of smoothed functions. Following [25], we derive upper and lower bounds of the expected value
function h¯(x) in terms of h˜(x), by applying Hoeffding’s Lemma. To present our result for the empirical
case, we first define an empirical floor function to derive a similar lower bound when the population mean
is estimated using a finite number of samples:
Definition 3.2. (Empirical Floor function) The Empirical Floor function is a function Lˆ ∶ [0,1] → [0,1],
such that for given values of ρ, σ, p, q, n, where ρ denotes the maximum L2 distortion, σ
2 denotes the
smoothing variance, p denotes the probability bound, q denotes the number of perturbations, and n is the
size of input of the function:
Lˆ(z) = Φ(Φ−1 (z − c) − 2ρ
σ
) − c where c = √ ln(2n(1 − p)−1)
2q
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(a) Sparsified SmoothGrad (b) Relaxed Sparsified SmoothGrad
Figure 4: Certified robustness bounds on ImageNet for different values of the sparsification parameter τ .
The lines shown are for the 60th percentile guarantee, meaning that 60 percent of images had guarantees
at least as tight as those shown. For both examples, K = 0.2n, and ρ = 0.03 (in units where pixel intensity
varies from 0 to 1.)
Corollary 1. Let h ∶ Rn → [0,1]n be a function such that for given values of q, σ, ∀ i, j ∈ [n], x, x˜ ∈
Rn, ∥x − x˜∥2 ≤ ρ, with probability at least p,
Lˆ(h˜i(x)) ≥ h˜j(x)⇒ h¯i(x˜) ≥ h¯j(x˜) (3.2)
Note that unlike the population case, this certificate bound is probabilistic. Another consequence of
Theorem 1 is that it allows us to derive certificates for the top-K overlap (denoted by R). In particular:
Corollary 2. ∀ x, x˜ ∈ Rn, ∥x − x˜∥2 ≤ ρ, σ ∈ R, q ∈ N, define Rcert(x,K) as the largest i ≤ K such that
Lˆ(h˜[i](x)) ≥ h˜[2K−i](x). Then, with probability at least p,
Rcert(x, K) ≤ R(x, x˜, K). (3.3)
Intuitively, if there is a sufficiently large gap between the ith and (2K − i)th largest elements of empirical
smoothed saliency maps, then we can certify that the overlap between top K elements of original and
perturbed population smoothed saliency maps is at least i with probability at least p.
Note that we can apply Corollary 2 directly to SmoothGrad (or Quadratic SmoothGrad), simply by
scaling the components of g(x) (or g(x)⊙ g(x)) to lie in the interval [0,1]. However, we observe that this
gives vacuous bounds for both of them when using the suggested hyperparameters from [10]. One issue
is that the suggested value for q (number of perturbations) is 50 which is too small to give useful bounds
in Corollary 1. For a standard size image from the ImageNet dataset (n = 224 × 224 × 3 = 150,528), with
p = 0.95, this gives c = 0.395 (using Definition equation 3.2). Note that even for a small ρ:
Lˆ(z) = Φ(Φ−1 (z − c) − 2ρ
σ
) − c ≈ Φ (Φ−1 (z − c)) − c = z − 2c
Thus the gap between z and Lˆ(z) is at least 0.79. We can see from Corollaries 1 and 2 that a gap of 0.79 (on a
scale of 1) is far too large to be of any practical use. We instead take q = 213, which gives a more manageable
estimation error of c = 0.031. However, we found that even with this adjustment, the bounds computed
using Corollary 2 are not satisfactory for either scaled SmoothGrad and or scaled Quadratic SmoothGrad
(see details in the appendix). This prompted the development of Sparsified SmoothGrad described in Section
3.1.
3.4 Relaxed Sparsified SmoothGrad
For some applications, it may be desirable to have at least some differentiable elements in the computed
saliency map. For this purpose, we also propose Relaxed Sparsified SmoothGrad:
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g
[γ,τ]
i (x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, if gi(x) < g[τn](x)
1, if gi(x) ≥ g[γn](x)
gi(x)
g[γn](x) , otherwise
(3.4)
Here, τ controls the degree of sparsification and γ controls the degree of clipping : a fraction γ of elements
are clipped to 1. Elements neither clipped nor sparsified are linearly scaled between 0 and 1. Note that
Relaxed Sparsified SmoothGrad is a generalization of Sparsified SmoothGrad. With no clipping (γ = 0),
we again achieve nearly-vacuous results. However, with only a small degree of clipping (γ = 0.01), we
achieve results very similar (although slightly worse) than sparsifed SmoothGrad; see Figure 4b. We use
Relaxed Sparsified SmoothGrad in this paper to test the performance of first-order adversarial attacks against
Sparsified SmoothGrad-like techniques.
3.5 Robustness Certificate based on Median Saliency Ranks
In this section, we show that if the median rank of a saliency map element over smoothing perturbations
is sufficiently small (i.e. near the top rank), then for an adversarially perturbed input, that element will
certifiably remain near the top rank of the proposed Sparsified SmoothGrad method with high probability.
This provides another theoretical reason for the robustness of the Sparsified SmoothGrad method.
To present this result, we first define the certified rank of an element in the saliency map as follows:
Definition 3.3 (Certified Rank). For a given input x and a given saliency map method (denoted by
h ∶ Rn → Rn), let the maximum adversarial distortion be ρ, i.e. ∥x˜ − x∥2 ≤ ρ. Then, for a probability p, the
certified rank for an element at index i (denoted by rankcert(x, i)) is defined as the minimum k such that
the condition:
Lˆ(h˜i(x)) ≥ h˜[k](x)
holds.
If the i-th element of the saliency map has a certified rank of k, using Corollary 1, we will have:
h¯i(x˜) ≥ h¯[k](x˜) with probability at least p.
That is, the ith element of the population smoothed saliency map is guaranteed to be as large as the smallest
n − k + 1 elements of the smoothed saliency map of any adversarially perturbed input.
Note that certified rank depends on the particular perturbations used to generate the smoothed saliency
map h˜(x). In the following result, we show that if the median rank of a gradient element at index i, over a
set of randomly generated perturbations, is less than a specified threshold value, then the certified rank of
that element in the Sparsified SmoothGrad saliency map generated using those perturbations can be upper
bounded.
Theorem 2. Let U be the set of q random perturbations for a given input x using the smoothing variance
σ2. Using the Sparsified SmoothGrad method, for probability p, we have
Median
∈U [rank(g(x + ), i)] ≤ ⌈τn⌉ ⇒ rankcert(x, i) ≤ ⌈τn⌉Lˆ( 1
2
) , (3.5)
where τ is the sparsification parameter of the Sparsified SmoothGrad method.
For instance, if ρ≪ σ and for sufficiently large number of smoothing perturbations (i.e. q →∞), we have
Lˆ(1/2)→ 1/2. If we set τ =K/(2n), then for indices whose median ranks are less than or equal to K/2, their
certified ranks will be less than or equal to K. That is, even after adversarially perturbing the input, they
will certifiably remain among the top K elements of the Sparsified SmoothGrad saliency map.
We present a more general form of this result in the appendix.
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3.6 Experimental Results
To test the empirical robustness of Sparsified SmoothGrad, we used an L2 attack on R(x, K) adapted from
the L∞ attack defined by [11]; see the appendix for details of our proposed attack. We chose Relaxed
Sparsified SmoothGrad (γ = .01, τ = .1) to test, rather than Sparsified SmoothGrad, because we are using a
gradient-based attack, and Sparsified SmoothGrad has no defined gradients. We tested on ResNet-18 with
CIFAR-10, with the attacker using a separately-trained, fully differential version of ResNet-18, with SoftPlus
activations in place of ReLU.
We present our empirical results in Figure 5. We observe that our method is significantly more robust
than the SmoothGrad method while its robustness is in par with the Quadratic SmoothGrad method with
the same number of smoothing perturbations. We note that our robustness certificate appears to be loose
for large perturbation magnitudes used in these experiments.
Figure 5: Empirical robustness of variants of
SmoothGrad to adversarial attack, tested on
CIFAR-10 with ResNet-18. Attack magnitude is in
units of standard deviations of pixel intensity. Ro-
bustness is measured as R(x, x˜,K)/K, where K =
n/4
Figure 6: Effectiveness of adversarial training on
MNIST. Increasing the regularization parameter λ
in the proposed adversarial training optimization
(Equation 4.1) significantly increases the robustness
of gradient-based saliency maps while it has little
effect on the classification accuracy.
.
4 Adversarial Training for Robust Saliency Maps
Adversarial training has been used extensively for making neural networks robust against adversarial attacks
on classification [21]. The key idea is to generate adversarial examples for a classification model, and then
re-train the model on these adversarial examples.
In this section, we present, for the first time, an adversarial training approach for fortifying deep learning
interpretations so that the saliency maps generated by the model (during test time) are robust against
adversarial examples. We focus on “vanilla gradient” saliency maps, although the technique presented here
can potentially be applied to any saliency map method which is differentiable w.r.t. the input. We solve the
following optimization problem for the network weights (denoted by θ):
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D[ `cls(x, y)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
Classification loss
+λ ∥g(x) − g(x˜)∥22´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
Robustness loss
], (4.1)
where x˜ is an adversarial perturbation for the saliency map generated from x. To generate x˜, we developed
an L2 attack on saliency maps by extending the L∞ attack of [11] (see the details in the appendix). `cls(x, y)
is the standard cross entropy loss, and λ is the regularization parameter to encourage consistency between
saliency maps of the original and adversarially perturbed images.
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We observe that the proposed adversarial training significantly improves the robustness of saliency maps.
Aggregate empirical results are presented in Figure 6, and examples of saliency maps are presented in
Figure 2. It is notable that the quality of the saliency maps is greatly improved for unperturbed inputs, by
adversarial training. We observe that even for very large value of λ, only a slight reduction in classification
accuracy occurs due to the added regularization term.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we studied the robustness of deep learning interpretation against adversarial attacks and pro-
posed two defense methods. Our first method is a sparsified variant of the popular SmoothGrad method
which computes the average saliency maps over random perturbations of the input. By establishing an easy-
to-compute robustness certificate for the interpretation problem, we showed that the proposed Sparsified
SmoothGrad is certifiably robust to adversarial attacks while producing high-quality saliency maps. We
provided extensive experiments on ImageNet samples validating our theory. Second, for the first time, we
introduced an Adversarial Training approach to further fortify deep learning interpretation against adversar-
ial attacks by penalizing the inconsistency of saliency maps between normal and crafted adversarial samples.
The proposed adversarial training significantly improved the robustness of saliency maps without degrad-
ing from the classification accuracy. We also observed that, somewhat surprisingly, adversarial training for
interpretation enhances the quality of the gradient-based saliency maps in addition to their robustness.
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A Proofs
Theorem 1. Let h ∶ Rn → [0,1]n be a bounded, real-valued function, σ2 ∈ R be the smoothing variance for
h, then ∀ i, j ∈ [n], x, x˜ ∈ Rn where x˜ − x = δ such that ∥δ∥2 ≤ ρ:
Φ(Φ−1 (h¯i(x)) − 2ρ
σ
) ≥ h¯j(x)⇒ h¯i(x˜) ≥ h¯j(x˜)
where Φ denotes the cdf function for the standard normal distribution and Φ−1 is its inverse.
We will prove this by first proving a more general lemma:
Lemma 1. For any bounded function h ∶ R→ [0,1] and smoothing variance σ2 ∈ R, Φ−1(h¯(x)) is Lipschitz-
continuous with respect to x, with Lipschitz constant σ−1.
Proof. By the definition of Lipschitz continuity, we must show that ∀δ ∈ Rn,
Φ−1(h¯(x)) − ∥δ∥2
σ
≤ Φ−1(h¯(x + δ)) ≤ Φ−1(h¯(x)) + ∥δ∥2
σ
(A.1)
We first define a new, randomized function H ∶ R→ {0,1},
H(x) ∼ Bern (h(x))
Then ∀ x ∈ Rn:
E [H(x + )] = E [EH [H(x + )]] = E [h(x + )] = h¯(x) (A.2)
Now, we apply the following Lemma (Lemma 4 from [23]):
Lemma (Cohen’s lemma). Let X ∼ N (x, σ2I) and Y ∼ N (x + δ, σ2I). Let f ∶ Rn → {0,1} be any
deterministic or random function, Then:
1. If S = {z ∈ Rn ∶ δT z ≤ β} for some β and Pr(f(X) = 1) ≥ Pr(X ∈ S), then Pr(f(Y ) = 1) ≥ Pr(Y ∈ S)
2. If S = {z ∈ Rn ∶ δT z ≥ β} for some β and Pr(f(X) = 1) ≤ Pr(X ∈ S), then Pr(f(Y ) = 1) ≤ Pr(Y ∈ S)
Using the same technique as used in the proof of Theorem 1 in [23], we fix x, δ and define,
β = σ∥δ∥2Φ−1(E [H(x + )])
Also define the half-spaces:
S− = {z ∶ δT z ≤ β + δTx} = {z ∶ δT (z − x) ≤ β}
S+ = {z ∶ δT z ≥ −β + δTx} = {z ∶ δT (z − x) ≥ −β}
Applying algebra from the proof of Theorem 1 in [23], we have,
Pr(X ∈ S−) = Φ( β
σ∥δ∥2 ) = E [H(x + )] (A.3)
Pr(X ∈ S+) = 1 −Φ( −β
σ∥δ∥2 ) = 1 − (1 −Φ( βσ∥δ∥2 )) = E [H(x + )] (A.4)
Pr(Y ∈ S−) = Φ( β
σ∥δ∥2 − ∥δ∥2σ ) = Φ(Φ−1(E [H(x + )]) − ∥δ∥2σ ) (A.5)
Pr(Y ∈ S+) = Φ(−(−β)
σ∥δ∥2 + ∥δ∥2σ ) = Φ(Φ−1(E [H(x + )]) + ∥δ∥2σ ) (A.6)
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Using equation A.3
Pr(H(X) = 1) = E [H(X)] = E [H(x + )] ≥ Pr(X ∈ S−)
Applying Statement 1 of Cohen’s lemma, using f =H and S = S−:
E [H(x + δ + )] = Pr(H(x + δ + ) = 1) = Pr(H(Y ) = 1) ≥ Pr(Y ∈ S−) (A.7)
Using equation A.4,
Pr(H(X) = 1) = E [H(X)] = E [H(x + )] ≤ Pr(X ∈ S+)
Applying Statement 2 of Cohen’s lemma, using f =H and S = S+:
E [H(x + δ + )] = Pr(H(x + δ + ) = 1) = Pr(H(Y ) = 1) ≤ Pr(Y ∈ S+) (A.8)
Using equation A.7 and equation A.8:
Pr(Y ∈ S−) ≤ E [H(x + δ + )] ≤ Pr(Y ∈ S+)
Then by equation A.5 and equation A.6:
Φ(Φ−1(E [H(x + )]) − ∥δ∥2
σ
) ≤ E [H(x + δ + )] ≤ Φ(Φ−1(E [H(x + )]) + ∥δ∥2
σ
)
Noting that Φ−1 is a monotonically increasing function, we have:
Φ−1(E [H(x + )]) − ∥δ∥2
σ
≤ Φ−1(E [H(x + δ + )]) ≤ Φ−1(E [H(x + )]) + ∥δ∥2
σ
Using equation A.2 yields equation A.1, which completes the proof.
We now proceed with the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. Applying Lemma 1 to hi and hj gives (recalling that x˜ = δ + x ):
Φ−1(h¯i(x)) − ρ
σ
≤ Φ−1(h¯i(x)) − ∥δ∥2
σ
≤ Φ−1(h¯i(x˜)) (A.9)
Φ−1(h¯j(x˜)) ≤ Φ−1(h¯j(x)) + ∥δ∥2
σ
≤ Φ−1(h¯j(x)) + ρ
σ
(A.10)
Then we have:
Φ(Φ−1 (h¯i(x)) − 2ρ
σ
) ≥ h¯j(x)
Ô⇒ Φ−1 (h¯i(x)) − ρ
σ
≥ Φ−1 (h¯j(x)) + ρ
σ
(by monotonicity of Φ−1)
Ô⇒ Φ−1(h¯i(x˜)) ≥ Φ−1 (h¯j(x)) + ρ
σ
(by equation A.9 )Ô⇒ Φ−1(h¯i(x˜)) ≥ Φ−1(h¯j(x˜)) (by equation A.10 )Ô⇒ h¯i(x˜) ≥ h¯j(x˜) (by monotonicity of Φ)
which proves the implication.
Corollary 1. Let h ∶ Rn → [0,1]n be a function such that for given values of q, σ:
h˜(x) = 1
q
q∑
i=1 h(x + i), i ∼ N(0, σ2I) (A.11)∀ i, j ∈ [n], x, x˜ ∈ Rn, ∥x − x˜∥2 ≤ ρ, with probability at least p,
Lˆ(h˜i(x)) ≥ h˜j(x)⇒ h¯i(x˜)) ≥ h¯j(x˜)
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Proof. By Hoeffding’s Inequality, for any c > 0, ∀ i ∶
Pr [∣h˜i(x) − h¯i(x)∣ ≥ c] ≤ 2e−2qc2 (A.12)
Then:
Pr [⋃
i
(∣h˜i(x) − h¯i(x)∣ ≥ c)] ≤ 2ne−2qc2 (A.13)
Since we are free to choose c, we define c such that 1 − p = 2ne−2qc2 , then:
c = √ ln(2n(1 − p)−1)
2q
(A.14)
Pr [⋃
i
(∣h˜i(x) − h¯i(x)∣ ≥ c)] ≤ 2ne−2qc2 = 1 − p
Ô⇒ 1 −Pr [⋃
i
(∣h˜i(x) − h¯i(x)∣ ≥ c)] ≥ p
Ô⇒ Pr [⋂
i
(∣h˜i(x) − h¯i(x)∣ < c)] ≥ p
Then with probability at least p:
h˜i(x) − c < h¯i(x)
h˜j(x) + c > h¯j(x) (A.15)
So:
Φ(Φ−1 (h˜i(x) − c)) − 2ρ
σ
) ≥ h˜j(x) + c Ô⇒ Φ(Φ−1 (h¯i(x)) − 2ρ
σ
) ≥ h¯j(x) (A.16)
The result directly follows from Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. ∀ x, x˜ ∈ Rn, ∥x − x˜∥2 ≤ ρ, σ ∈ R, q ∈ N, with probability at least p,
R(x, x˜, K) ≥ Rcert(x, K) (A.17)
where Rcert(x,K) is the largest i ≤K such that Lˆ(h˜[i](x)) ≥ h˜[2K−i](x).
Proof. Note that the proof of Corollary 1 guarantees that with probability at least p, all estimates h˜(x) are
within the approximation bound c of h¯(x). So we can assume that Corollary 1 will apply simultaneously to
all pairs of indices i, j, with probability p.
We proceed to prove by contradiction.
Let i = Rcert(x,K)Ô⇒ Lˆ(h˜[i](x)) ≥ h˜[2K−i](x),
Suppose there exists x˜ such that:
R(x, x˜, K) < i,
Since Lˆ is a monotonically increasing function,
Lˆ(h˜[i](x)) ≥ h˜[2K−i](x)
Ô⇒ Lˆ(h˜[i′](x)) ≥ h˜[j′](x), ∀ i′ ≤ i, j′ ≥ 2K − i,
and therefore by Corollary 1:
∀ m,n rank(h˜(x),m) ≤ i, rank(h˜(x), n) ≥ 2K − i Ô⇒ h¯m(x˜)) ≥ h¯n(x˜) (A.18)
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Let X be the set of indices in the top K elements in h˜(x), and X˜ be the set of indices in the top K elements
in h¯(x˜).
By assumption, X and X˜ share fewer than i elements, so there will be at least K − i+1 elements in X˜ which
are not in X.
All of these elements have rank at least K + 1 in h˜(x).
Thus by pigeonhole principle, there is some index l ∈ X˜ − X, such that rank(h˜(x), l) ≥ K +K − i + 1 =
2K − i + 1 ≥ 2K − i.
Thus by Equation equation A.18,
∀m, where rank(h˜(x),m) ≤ i, h¯m(x˜) ≥ h¯l(x˜) (A.19)
Hence, there are i such elements where rank(h˜(x),m) ≤ i: these elements are clearly in X.
Because l ∈ X˜, Equation equation A.19 implies that these elements are all also in X˜. Thus X and X˜ share
at least i elements,which contradicts the premise.
(In this proof we have implicitly assumed that the top K elements of a vector can contain more than K
elements, if ties occur, but that rank is assigned arbitrarily in cases of ties. In practice, ties in smoothed
scores will be very unlikely.)
A.1 General Form and Proof of Theorem 2
We note that Theorem 2 can be used to derive a more general bound for any saliency map method that for
an input x, first maps g(x) to an elementwise function that only depends on the rank of the current element
in g(x) and not on the individual value of the element. We denote the composition of the gradient function
and this elementwise function as g[rank]. The only properties that the function must satisfy is that it must
be monotonically decreasing and non-negative. Thus, we have the following statement:
Theorem 2. Let T be the threshold value and let U be the set of q random perturbations for a given input
x using the smoothing variance σ2 and let p be the probability bound. If i is an element index such that:
Median
∈U [rank(g(x + ), i)] ≤ T (A.20)
Then:
rankcert(x, i) ≤ ∑nj=1 g[rank][j] (x)
Lˆ(g[rank][T ] (x)
2
) (A.21)
Furthermore:
n∑
j=1 g
[rank][j] (x), Lˆ(g[rank][T ] (x)2 ) are both independent of x. Thus RHS is a constant. (A.22)
Proof. Let the elementwise function be f ∶ N → R+, i.e f takes the rank of the element as the input and
outputs a real number. Furthermore, we assume that f is a non-negative monotonically decreasing function.
Thus g
[rank]
i (x) = f(rank(g(x), i)).
We use f(i) to denote the constant value that f maps elements of rank i to.
Note that g
[rank][i] (x) is the ith largest element of g[rank](x).
Since f is a monotonically decreasing function:
g
[rank][i] (x) = f(i) ∀ i ∈ [n]
Thus g
[rank][i] (x) is independent of x, we simply use g[rank][i] (⋅) to denote f(i), i.e:
g
[rank][i] (⋅) = f(i) ∀ i ∈ [n]
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Because Median∈U [rank(g(x + ), i)] ≤ T , for at least half of sampling instances  in U , rank(g(x+), i) ≤ T .
So in these instances g
[rank]
i (x + ) ≥ f(T ),
The remaining half or fewer elements are mapped to other nonnegative values.
Thus the sample mean:
g˜
[rank]
i (x) = 1q ∑∈U g[rank]i (x + ) ≥ g[rank][T ] (⋅)/2
Using Corollary 1, g¯
[rank]
i (x) is certifiably as large as all elements with indices j such that:
Lˆ(g[rank][T ] (⋅)/2) ≥ g˜[rank]j (x)
.
Now we will find an upper bound on the number of elements with indices j such that:
g˜
[rank]
j (x) > Lˆ(g[rank][T ] (⋅)/2)
Because all the ranks from 1 to n will occur in every sample in U, we have:
∀  ∈ U, n∑
k=1 g
[rank]
k (x + ) = n∑
k=1 g
[rank][k] (⋅)
Ô⇒ n∑
k=1 g˜
[rank]
k (x) = n∑
k=1
1
q
∑
∈U g
[rank]
i (x + ) = n∑
k=1 g
[rank][k] (⋅)
Thus strictly fewer than∑nk=1 g[rank][k] (⋅)/Lˆ(g[rank][T ] (⋅)/2) elements will have mean greater than Lˆ(g[rank][T ] (⋅)/2).
Hence, g¯i(x) is certifiably at least as large as n − (∑nk=1 g[rank][k] (⋅)/Lˆ(g[rank][T ] (⋅)/2)) + 1 elements, which by
the definition of rankcert(x, i) yields the result.
Theorem 2 in the main text follows trivially, because in the Sparsified SmoothGrad case, ∑nk=1 g[τ][k](⋅) = T ,
and g
[τ][T ](⋅) = 1. Note that this represents the tightest possible realization of this general theorem.
B Related Works
[6] defines a baseline, which represents an input absent of information and determines feature importance
by accumulating gradient information along the path from the baseline to the original input. [7] builds
interpretable neural networks by learning basis concepts that satisfy an interpretability criteria. [8] proposes
methods to assess the quality of saliency maps. Although these methods can produce visually pleasing
results, they can be sensitive to noise and adversarial perturbations.
[12] introduced adversarial attacks for classification in deep learning. That work dealt with L2 attacks,
and uses L-BFGS optimization to minimize the norm of the perturbation. [20] provide an L2 attack for
classification which is often considered state of the art.
One strategy to make classifiers more robust to adversarial attacks is randomized smoothing. [25] use
randomized smoothing to develop certifiably robust classifiers in both the L1 and L2 norms. They show
that if Gaussian smoothing is applied to class scores, a gap between the highest smoothed class score and
the next highest smoothed score implies that the highest smoothed class score will still be highest under
all perturbations of some magnitude. This guarantees that the smoothed classifier will be robust under
adversarial perturbation.
[27] and [23] consider a related formulation. Cohen gives a bound that is tight in the case of linear
classifiers and gives significantly larger certified radii. In their formulation, the unsmoothed classifier c is
treated as a black box outputting just a discrete class label. The smoothed classifier outputs the class
observed with greatest frequency over noisy samples.
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In the last couple of years, several approaches have been proposed to for interpreting neural network
outputs. [5] computes the gradient of the class score with respect to the input. [10] computes the average
gradient-based importance values generated from several noisy versions of the input. [6] defines a baseline,
which represents an input absent of information and determines feature importance by accumulating gradient
information along the path from the baseline to the original input. [7] builds interpretable neural networks
by learning basis concepts that satisfy an interpretability criteria. [8] proposes methods to assess the quality
of saliency maps. Although these methods can produce visually pleasing results, they can be sensitive to
noise and adversarial perturbations ([11], [26]).
As mentioned in Section 1, several approaches have been introduced for interpreting image classification
by neural networks ([5, 10, 6, 29]). It has also been shown that deep networks can be sensitive to noise and
adversarial perturbations ([11], [26]).
C L2 Attack on Saliency Maps
We developed an L2 norm attack on R
cert, based on [11]’s L∞ attack. Our algorithm is presented as
Algorithm 1. We deviate from [11]’s attack in the following ways.:
• We use gradient descent, rather than gradient sign descent: this is a direct adaptation to the L2 norm.
• We initialize learning rate as ρ∥∇D(x0)∥2 , and then decrease learning rate with increasing iteration count,
proportionately (for the most part) to the reciprocal of the iteration count. These are both standard
practices for gradient descent.
• We use random initialization and random restarts, also standard optimization practices.
• If a gradient descent step would cross a decision boundary, we use backtracking line search to reduce
the learning rate until the step stays on the correct-class side. This allows the optimization to get
arbitrarily close to decision boundaries without crossing them.
We measured the effectiveness of our attack (Q = 100, P = 20, T = 5) against a slight modification of [11]’s
attack, in which the image was projected (if necessary) onto the L2 ball at every iteration, and also clipped
to fit within image box constraints (this was not mentioned in [11]’s original algorithm). For this attack,
we set the (L∞) learning rate parameter at ρ/500, and ran for up to 100 iterations. We also tested against
random perturbations. For random perturbations, up to 100 points were tested until a point in the correct
class was identified. We tested these attacks on both “vanilla gradient” and SmoothGrad saliency maps.
See Figure 7. Experimental conditions are as described in Section D for experiments on CIFAR-10. In this
figure, for each attack magnitude, we discard any image on which any optimization method failed.
D Description of Experiments in Section 3
For ImageNet experiments (Figures 1-b and 4-a,b), we use ResNet-50, using the model pre-trained on Ima-
geNet that is provided by torchvision.models, and images were pre-processed according to the recommended
procedure for that model. In all of these figures, data are from the ILSV RC2012 validation set, samples
size is 64, and the main data lines represent the 60th percentile in the sample of the calculated robustness
certificate. Error bars represent the 48th and 72th percentile values, corresponding to a 95% confidence
interval for the population quantile.
For CIFAR-10 experiments, we train a ResNet-18 model on the CIFAR-10 training set (with pixel inten-
sities normalized to σ = 1, µ = 0 in each channel) using Stochastic Gradient Descent with Momentum as
implemented by PyTorch[30]. The following training parameters were used:
Early stopping was used to maximize accuracy relative to the CIFAR-10 test set (this should not affect
the validity of our results, because we are not concerned with classification accuracy.) For adversarial attacks,
we train a version of ResNet-18 with SoftMax activations instead of ReLU. The adversarial attack used was
the L2 attack described in Algorithm 1, with P = 20,Q = 100, T = 5. When adversarially attacking images
smoothed with q = 8192 perturbations with this model, fewer perturbations are are used (512). In these
experiments, the sample size is 40. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval of the population mean.
In Figure 5, instances where the adversarial attack failed were not counted at each point.
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Algorithm 1 L2 attack on top-k overlap
Input: k, image x, saliency map function h, iteration number P , random sampling iteration number Q, L2
perturbation norm constraint ρ, classifier c, restarts number T
Output: Adversarial example x˜
1: Define D(z) = −∑i, rank(h(x),i)≤k hi(z)
2: for t = 1, ..., T do
3: loop
4: δ ← Uniformly random vector on L2 = ρ sphere.
5: x0 ← x + δ
6: Clip x0 such that it falls within image box constraints.
7: if c(x0) = c(x) then break inner loop
8: if Q total iterations have passed over all t cycles of random sampling then
9: break outer loop
10: end if
11: end loop
12: α ← ρ∥∇D(x0)∥2
13: for p = 1, ..., P do
14: loop
15: xp ← xp−1 + α∇D(xp−1)
16: If necessary, project xp such that ∥xp − x∥2 ≤ ρ
17: Clip xp such that it falls within image box constraints.
18: if c(xp) = c(x) then
19: break inner loop
20: else
21: α ← α
2
22: end if
23: end loop
24: α ← pα
p+1
25: end for
26: x˜t = arg maxz∈{x1,...,xP }D(z)
27: end for
28: if random sampling failed at every iteration then fail
29: x˜ = arg maxz∈{x˜1,...,x˜T }D(z)
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(a) Attacks on vanilla gradient method. (b) Attacks on SmoothGrad method (q=64).
Figure 7: Comparison of attack methods on images in CIFAR-10. See text of section C.
Figure 8: Network architecture used for the MNIST classification. SoftPlus activations are applied after
both convolutional layers, and after the first fully connected layer.
E Adversarial Training Architecture Details
We use the Adam optimizer and generate new adversarial examples after each batch of training according
to the updated model. We use a simple convolutional neural network, with SoftPlus activations to ensure
differentiability of the saliency map, on the MNIST data set (Figure 8). Adversarial perturbations of norm
up to ρ = 10 standard deviations of pixel intensity were used. The adversarial attack used was the L2 attack
described in Algorithm 1, with P = 15,Q = 100, T = 3. Training was performed for 30 epochs using 48,000
images from the MNIST training set, testing was on the entire MNIST test set. Instances where Algorithm
1 failed were not counted in the averages of saliency map robustness, and were rare. (Highest frequency was
for λ = 0, at 0.11%). We used the implementation of Adam Optimizer provided with PyTorch [30], with
default training parameters. These are (Table 2):
Table 2 Hyper-parameters used in model training for MNIST experiments.
Learning Rate 0.001
L2 regularization parameter 0
β (.9,.999)
 10−8
Batch Size 512
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Table 1 Hyper-parameters used in model training for CIFAR experiments.
Momentum 0.9
L2 regularization parameter .0005
Epochs (max) 375
Learning Rate Schedule .1 (epoch < 150), .01 (epoch ≥ 150)
Batch Size 128
F Additional Example Images
See Figure 9.
G Additional Images from Adversarial Training Experiment
See Figure 10.
H Bounds for Scaled SmoothGrad, Quadratic SmoothGrad, and
Relaxed Sparsified SmoothGrad with γ = 0
In the text, we mention that we achieve vacuous bounds for Scaled SmoothGrad, Quadratic SmoothGrad,
and Relaxed Sparsified SmoothGrad with γ = 0. Here are these bounds (Figure 11):
I Comparison of Bounds to Empirical Performance for Relaxed
Sparsified SmoothGrad.
We present a detailed view of Figure 5, for small magnitude perturbations, with the robustness certificate
shown. (Figure 12)
J Comparison to Bounds in [25]
[25] approaches the classification case for certified robustness by smoothing, by using bounds directly com-
parably to Theorem 1, but applying them to the class score elements, rather than the saliency map elements:
bounds are certified by demonstrating that the top class score is certifiably larger than all other class scores.
However, as noted by [23], these bounds are rather loose, and [23] gives significantly tighter bounds specifi-
cally for classification case, which we extend to apply to interpretation. In Figure 13, we compare our bounds
for interpretation to a straightforward application of [25]’s results for class scores to saliency scores. Note
that [25]’s results have a free parameter, for which we numerically maximize the bound.
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Figure 9: An illustration of different saliency maps on some images from CIFAR-10. The input image is
shown in the first column (far left), with interpretations using Relaxed Sparsified SmoothGrad (τ = .1, γ = .01,
second column from left), Quadratic SmoothGrad (third column), and SmoothGrad (fourth column). σ = .2,
and the noise is scaled to the range of pixel intensities of the image.
Figure 10: Additional figures from adversarial training on MNIST, for various λ. Note that Figure 6 shows
for λ = 200.
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Figure 11: Bounds for Scaled SmoothGrad and and Relaxed Sparsified SmoothGrad with γ = 0. Not that
Scaled SmoothGrad is equivalent to Relaxed Sparsified SmoothGrad with τ = 1. Directly comparable to
Figure 4b. For the Quadratic case, no bounds are certifiable.
Figure 12: Empirical robustness of variants of SmoothGrad to adversarial attack, tested on CIFAR-10 with
ResNet-18. Attack magnitude is in units of standard deviations of pixel intensity. Robustness is measured
as R(x, x˜,K)/K, where K = n/4
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Figure 13: Comparison of Theorem 1 to results from [23]
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